The question isn’t whether your major project has assumptions. It’s whether anyone has tested the ones that would break it.

Every major project decision rests on a set of judgements about the future. Some of those judgements are well-evidenced. Some are reasonable given what is known. And some — the ones that quietly determine whether the whole thing holds together — have never been properly examined at all.

We call this the assumption problem. And in our experience working across infrastructure, energy, nuclear and defence, it is one of the most consistent sources of project failure. Not because organisations don’t make assumptions — they have to — but because assumptions are routinely treated as background detail rather than as the load-bearing structure of the decision.

When a major project goes wrong, the post-mortem almost always uncovers the same pattern. There was an assumption. It was stated once, early on. Nobody owned it. Nobody tested it. And by the time it failed, so much had been built on top of it that the damage was already done.

A major offshore wind programme submitted a business case built on an assumption that a specialist marine installation contractor would be available on the programme’s required timeline. The assumption was noted in the procurement strategy but never stress-tested against current market conditions. No one owned it. Eighteen months later, when the installation package went to tender, the market had tightened significantly — two of the three viable contractors were already committed to competing programmes, and the third submitted a price forty percent above the estimate. The schedule slipped by fourteen months. The assumption had never appeared in the risk register. It had been treated as background context, not a decision-critical dependency.

That programme was not unusual. The failure mode — an untested commercial assumption quietly sitting beneath a confident business case — repeats itself across sectors and project types with remarkable regularity.

The word nobody interrogates

Before anything else, it is worth being precise about what an assumption actually is. An assumption is a judgement about conditions, behaviours, constraints, events or outcomes that has not yet been proven but is being relied upon for planning or decision-making.

The critical word is relied upon. Assumptions become dangerous not when they exist, but when they are unclear, unstated, unsupported by evidence, or treated as settled fact. A project can carry a great many assumptions without being in trouble. What it cannot carry is a load-bearing assumption that nobody has tested.

Assumptions and risks are related but distinct. An assumption describes something being relied upon; a risk describes what happens if it fails. The assumption that planning consent will be granted by Q1 2027 creates the risk that, if consent is delayed, the funding window is lost and the schedule collapses. Most organisations manage risks. Far fewer actively manage the assumptions that generate them — which means the root cause often goes unaddressed.

Where assumptions live

One reason assumption challenge is so consistently neglected is that assumptions don’t announce themselves. They are embedded in business cases, cost models, procurement strategies, demand forecasts and schedule logic. They are often implicit — the thing the plan requires to be true that nobody has written down as a claim to be tested.

In major projects, assumptions cluster across nine categories. Individually, each may look manageable. The danger emerges when you map them together and discover that the entire business case is resting on a single fragile category — market capacity, or regulatory stability, or organisational readiness — that nobody has examined with any rigour.

Strategic

  • Policy need remains stable
  • Demand materialises at forecast levels
  • Strategic sponsorship is retained
  • Benefits remain valuable if conditions change

Scope

  • Requirements remain stable
  • Interfaces with other projects are understood
  • No major design changes required
  • Current technical solution remains viable

Cost

  • Inflation remains within forecast levels
  • Market prices behave as expected
  • Productivity assumptions are realistic
  • Contingency is sufficient for risk exposure

Schedule

  • Planning and consents achieved on time
  • Procurement proceeds without material delay
  • Critical path activities are not disrupted
  • Key dependencies available when required

Benefits

  • Users adopt the asset, service or system
  • Demand forecasts are realised
  • Operating model changes are implemented
  • Benefits are not eroded by delay

Commercial

  • The market has sufficient capacity
  • The procurement route attracts competition
  • Risk transfer is affordable and deliverable
  • Suppliers accept the proposed model

Stakeholder

  • Stakeholder support remains stable
  • Opposition is manageable
  • Regulatory requirements don’t materially change
  • Political sponsorship remains consistent

Delivery capability

  • The client team can manage delivery
  • Key roles can be recruited and retained
  • Governance forums make timely decisions
  • The supply chain has required capacity

Interfaces & dependencies

  • Third parties deliver enabling works on time
  • Interface risks are understood and controlled
  • Adjacent projects don’t create conflicts
  • Data, land or consents available when needed

The value of mapping assumptions by category is not just organisational neatness. It reveals concentration. A project that discovers seven of its ten critical assumptions sit in the commercial category — all dependent on a specific market behaving in a specific way — has learned something important about where its real exposure lies.

The load-bearing test

Not every assumption deserves the same level of scrutiny. Most don’t require deep analysis. But a small number — the ones on which the recommendation actually stands — demand it.

The question that separates the two is simple:

If this assumption proves wrong, would we still make the same decision?

If the answer is no, the assumption is load-bearing. It needs evidence. It needs an owner. It needs sensitivity testing. And it should be visible in the decision paper — not buried in a technical appendix where no one at the table will read it.

Load-bearing assumptions are not always the ones that feel risky. Sometimes they are the ones that feel obvious — so obvious that no one thinks to question them. The assumption that a market will remain competitive. The assumption that a key partner organisation will remain capable. The assumption that a regulatory regime will stay stable long enough for the investment to make sense. These are precisely the assumptions that tend not to appear in risk registers, because they are treated as the background conditions of the project rather than as claims that could be false.

Three patterns recur often enough to be worth naming.

The inherited assumption. A judgement made early in the project’s life — sometimes before the current team was involved — that gets carried forward through successive business cases without re-examination. The original context has changed. The assumption hasn’t.

The optimistic anchor. An assumption that makes the numbers work. Demand forecasts set just high enough to clear the approval threshold. A cost estimate that only holds if productivity achieves the upper end of the benchmark range. These assumptions are load-bearing by design — the case falls apart without them — but they are often the least rigorously tested.

The unowned dependency. An assumption about what another organisation will do. An enabling works contractor. A planning authority. A technology supplier. These assumptions are particularly dangerous because no one in the project team has direct control over them, which makes them easy to treat as someone else’s problem.

Evidence, confidence and the honest conversation

Testing a load-bearing assumption means asking a harder question than “is there evidence for this?” It means asking whether the evidence is strong enough to justify the level of confidence being claimed in the decision.

A simple five-point scale is enough to force that conversation:

RatingWhat it means
1 — Very lowLargely speculative or based on optimism. Little reliable evidence. The decision should not proceed without further testing.
2 — LowSome evidence exists but it is incomplete, outdated or not directly comparable. Needs further work before a major decision.
3 — ModerateReasonable evidence base but material uncertainty remains. Can inform planning but requires sensitivity testing.
4 — HighSupported by good evidence, relevant benchmarks or expert review. Subject to normal uncertainty, not exceptional risk.
5 — Very highStrongly evidenced, recently tested, independently reviewed. Unlikely to change materially before the next decision point.

The value of this isn’t precision — it’s provocation. A project that discovers its three most load-bearing assumptions are all rated 1 or 2 is not ready for approval, regardless of how well the business case is written. The rating creates a conversation that the evidence alone rarely does.

What this looks like in a decision paper

The most practical change any programme director or SRO can demand is deceptively simple: require that every major decision paper includes a visible summary of the assumptions on which the recommendation depends, not in an appendix, but in the body of the paper, in front of the people making the decision.

That summary should answer four questions for each critical assumption: what are we relying on? How confident are we, and on what basis? What happens if it’s wrong? And what would need to be true before we should proceed?

A worked example looks like this:

AssumptionCategoryLoad-bearing?ConfidenceKey risk if wrongAction / condition
At least three compliant bids received under proposed procurement modelCommercialYes2 — LowCost estimate and risk transfer model become invalidMarket engagement to be completed before tender issue
Planning consent granted by Q1 2027ScheduleYes3 — ModerateFunding window missed; acceleration costs triggeredPre-application meeting with LPA within 60 days
Operating model changes implemented within 6 months of go-liveBenefitsYes2 — LowForecast savings not realised; BCR falls below thresholdExecutive sponsor and funding confirmed prior to approval
Enabling works completed by third party by end of Q3 2026DependencyConditional3 — ModerateMain contractor mobilisation delayed; cost overrunEscalation trigger defined; owner assigned

The point is not the table. The point is the discipline of asking the question — and being honest about the answer — before the decision is made rather than after it has failed.

Assumptions need to be written to be tested

There is a particular failure mode worth naming: the assumption so vaguely stated that it cannot be tested, owned or falsified. These are not assumptions. They are wishes dressed up as planning.

The difference between a weak assumption and a strong one is the difference between something you can act on and something you can only hope for:

Weak The market will respond positively to the procurement.

Testable At least three credible tier-one contractors will submit compliant bids under the proposed procurement model by the planned tender deadline, based on market engagement completed in Q3 2024.

Weak Stakeholder opposition will be manageable.

Testable No statutory objections from the three named local authorities will be received during the planning examination, based on pre-application engagement completed in Q4 2024 and documented in the stakeholder log.

A well-written assumption names what is being relied upon, how the evidence was obtained, and by when it needs to remain valid. If an assumption cannot be written in that form, it is a signal that the team hasn’t yet been precise enough about what they’re actually claiming — which is itself important information.

The question leaders should be asking

The failure to challenge assumptions is not primarily a process problem. It is a culture problem. It happens because assumptions feel settled. Because questioning them feels like questioning the project. Because the team that built the business case has a stake in its conclusions. Because boards and approving authorities are often presented with a recommendation rather than an interrogation.

The most powerful thing a senior leader can do is simply ask the question that is almost never asked directly: if this assumption proves wrong, does the recommendation still stand? Ask it about the market. Ask it about the schedule dependency. Ask it about the operating model change that the benefits case requires. Ask it about the regulatory stability the investment is predicated on.

In our experience, the moment that question is asked seriously — not rhetorically, but as a genuine request for an honest answer — it changes the quality of the conversation. Teams that have never been asked before often discover, in the course of answering, that they don’t actually know. That is not a comfortable discovery. But it is a far better one to make before the decision than after it.

The standard for a major project decision is not whether the business case looks robust. It is whether the people approving it understand what must be true for it to hold — and what they are accepting if it turns out not to be.

Think about the last major decision your programme submitted for approval. Can you name the three assumptions on which it most depends? Do you know who owns them? Do you know how confident the evidence actually is? And do you know what happens to the recommendation if any of them proves wrong?

If the answers are unclear, that is the assumption problem. And it is solvable — but only if someone decides to ask.

Working with Kaleido

The gap described in this article is the gap Kaleido was built to close.

We work with leaders and project teams across infrastructure, energy, and defence to bring Decision Intelligence into the way programmes are run. That means helping organisations frame the right problems before committing to answers, build investment cases that are honest about uncertainty, and put the analytical and governance structures in place that allow consequential choices to be made with clarity rather than momentum.

Our work spans strategic advisory, integrated risk and cost modelling, and digital programme controls — not as separate offerings, but as connected capabilities that serve a single purpose: ensuring that the decisions at the heart of a programme are as well-founded as the assets they produce.

If any of what this article describes feels familiar, we would be glad to talk.